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CONTRACTS

INFANTS.

All persons are infants, in legal contemplation,
The period of majority differs

until they arrive at majority.
in different

countries, but the general rule is twenty-one

By the Civil law,

years.

which obtains in

some of the old

countries, emancipation does not take place until the person
is twenty-five.
It is supposed that the selection of the age of
twenty-one,

rather tian

some otner period,

at which majority

should be attained, originated in the old feudal system, as
at that time the

infant was first

presumed

to be physically

capable, if a male, of doing knight's service, and, if a female,

not before

duties would

of a

suitable age, to marry any one upon whom

devolve.

Bingham on Infancy,

1.

The conmon law of England from the earliest

times

has fixed twenty-one as the period of absolute majority for
both sexes.

The same rule applies in most of the United State

though in some of the western states females have an enlarged
capacity

to act at the age of eighteen.
Stephenson v 'Yestfall, 18 Ill. 209.
The day upon which the infant attains

his lawful

age is on the beginning of the day next preceding the twentyfirst anniversary of his birth.

Tie case of State v Clark,

2
3 Harr.

(Del.) was one which arose over the right of a person

to vote before his twenty-first birthday.
his opinion said:

"It

Chief J. Bayard in

is to be observed that a person becomes

of age on the first instant

of the last day of the twenty-

first year next before the anniversary of his birth;

thus,

if

a person were born at any hour of the first day of january,
1801,

(even) a fww minutes before twelve o'clock of the night

of that day, he would be of full age at the first instant of
the 31st of December, 1821, although nearly forty-eight hours
before he had actually attained the fAll

age of twenty-one,

according to years, days, hours, and minutes, because there is
not in law in this respect any fractions of a day;

and it is

the same whether a thing is done upon one moment of the day oianother.

II.
Ve now come to our main topic,
fants.

-he contracts

of in-

A contract as defined by Story is a deliberate engage-

ment between competent parties upon a leL al consideration to
do or to abstain from doing

some act.

In

its

iidcst

sense it

includes records and specialties, but the term is usually employed to

designate only simple or parol contracts.

By par1

contracts is to be understood not only verbal and unwritten
contracts, bit all contracts of record not under seal.

This

is strictly the legal signification of the term contract,

in-

asmuch as that reciprocity of consideration and mutuality of
agreement, which are necessary to

constitute a parol agree-

ment, are not necessary in obligations of record and in specialties.
III.
VOID ACTS OF AN INFANT.
The method taken in law to protect an infant against
the effects of his own weakness has been to consider his acts
as not binding, and allow him to

rescind all contracts enter-

ed into by him, with certain exceptions.
There are, however, two degrees in which his acts or
instruments appear to be not binding:
they never existed--wholly void;

First, by being as if

and, secondly, as being de-

feasible at the election of the party with wYhom they originat-

ed;

voidable only.

that is,

Ringham on Infancy, 8.
A void act never is and never can be binding,

ei-

ther on the party with whom it originated, or on others.
person claiming through or under it
act

No

can succeed, and the void

can never at any time or by any means be confirmed or ren-

dered valid.
Bingham on Infancy 9.
Any person interested may take advantage of a void
act of an infant, which is not the case when the act is simply voidable.
There is much confusion in the older books on the
subject of void and voidable acts and contracts.

But the

courts at a later day ,-"o on the theory that infancy being a
personal privilege, that he should be bound by no act which is
not beneficial to him,and their contracts are divided into
three classes:

(1) Void (2) Voidable

(3) Binding.

The main difficulty with the courts was to distinguish between void and voidable.
Mr. Bingham, after an exhaustive review of the English cases,

decided that the only safe rule to follow was

that "acts which are capable of being legally ratified are
voidable, and acts which are incapable of being legally ratified are absolutely void.

5
Bingham on Infancy 234.
Another rule laid down by Chief J. Parker in tile
case of Witney v Dutch,

14 Mass.

457 was tlat

"whenever the

act done may be for tne infant's benefit, it sniall not be considered void; but he shall

ave his election ,inen he comes of

age to affirm or avoi3 it.

Another rule, cited and approved

by Judge Story, was that
the contract is

",here the court can pronounce that

for the benefit of tLe infant, then it shall

bind him, and .Y.vere it is prejudicial to the infant, it shall
be void; and where it is of an uncertain nature, the infant
shall have his election of affirming or avoiding it.
But these old rules have been to some extent modified, and the tendenc, of the courts at tnie present time is to
regard all contracts of infancy voidable only.
In support of this doctrine may be cited the case
of Fetiow v 'Viseman, 40 Ind. 184,

here the authorities are

collected and reviewed, and the rule is stated as follows:
"First, that an infant's contracts for necessaries are as
valid and binding upon the infant as the contracts of an adult;
and that such contracts cannot be disaffirmed, and need not
be ratified before they can be enforced.

Second, the con-

tract of a- infant appointing an agent or attorney is absolutely void and incapable of ratification. Third, any contract
that is illegal by reason of being against a statute or pub-

lic policy is absolutely void and incapable of ratification.
Fourth, all other contracts made by an infant are voidable
only, and may be affirmed or disaffirmed by the infant at his
election when he arrives at his majority."
So also an infant's bond with penalty ana for the
payment of interest was formerly held to be void on the ground
that it cannot possibly be for his benefit.
Fisher v Mowbray, ' East. 330.
So a bond executed by a minor as

surety is void.

Allen v Minor, 2 Call. 70
An infant's promissory note as

surety is void.

Maffles v Wightman, 4 Conn. 376.
But the old authorities at the best are not very
clear upon this point.

All of them seem to admit a distinc-

tion between void and voidable, and yet seem to disagree with
respect to the acts to be

classed under either of those heads.

One result in which they all appear to agree is
stated by Lord Mansfield in the case of Zouch v Parsons, 3
Burr.,

that whenever the act done may be for the benefit of

the infant, it shall not be considered void, but that he shall
have his election wnen he comes of age to affinm or avoid it,
and this appears to be the only clear and definite proposition which can be extracted from the authorities.

The appli-

cation of this principle is, however, not free from difficulty,

7
for when a note or other simple contract is made by an infant
himself, it may be made

ood by his assent without any inqui-

ry whether it was for his benefit or to his Frejudice.

For if

he had made a bad bargain in a purchase of goods, and -ives
his promissory note for the price, and when he comes of age
had agreed to pay the note, he would be bound by his agreement
although he might have been ruined by the purchase.
I think the reasoning laid down in 'Vhitney v Dutch,
14 Mass. 157, is correct, and the rule which is followed today, namely, "All simple contracts by an infant which are not
founded on an illegal consideration are strictly not void but
voidable, and may be made good by ratification.

They remain a

legal substratium for a future assent until avoided by the
infant, and if instead of avoiding he oonfirm them when he hs
a legal capacity to make a contract, they are in all respects
like contracts made by an adult.
As an example of the trend of the courts in this direction may be mentioned the case of Yates v Lyon, 61 Barb.
205.

The text-books lay down the rule that an assignment made

by a firm, one of whom is an infant, for the benefit of creditors will be void, and cite the above case as an authority
for tnat proposition;

but a careful reading of the case will

show that the court, although they held that assignment void,
yet were inclined to hold that if the infant be justly indebt-

8
ed to his creditors, they ought to be paid.

So also, as be-

fore stated, it was formerly held th'at bonds given by infants
vith penalties attached were void, but accor-ing to later decisions they are only voidable.
Weaver v Jones, 24 Ala. 420.
Same rule in regard to promissory notes.
Swasey v Vanderheyden, 10 Johns. 33.
Fetiow v 71iseman, 40 Ind. 140.
So also as to the assignment or in. orsement of a
promissory note or bill of exchange.
Nightingale v Withington, 15 Mass. 272.
Professor Parsons lays down the rule in general
terms that

"the contract of an infant

(if not for necessa-

ries) is voidable; that is, he may disavow it and so annul it,
either before his majority or within a reasonable
lt;u

time afte

and in a note appended to this declaration, while frankly

admitting that the rule, that those contracts are voidable only
which are for the infant's benefit,

and those which are prej-

udicial are absolutely void, is adopted and recognized by
many authorities, advances the opinion that this distinction
is now practically obsolete, and unqualifiedly asserts that
the more recent authorities 'iold

that all contracts of infamts,

with the exception perhaps of the appointment of an attorney,
are voidable only and none absoliutely void.

Parsons Mercantile

Law 4.

IV.
ACTS BINDING UPON THE INstANT.
Contracts for necessaries are binding upon an infant.
The ground upon

for

of infats

vhich the contracts

necessaries are enforced has been said to be not because they
are

contracts,

but only "since an infant must live as well as

a man" the law gives a reasonable price

to those who

furnish

him with necessaries.
This class includes by far the greatest number of
cases in which an

infant is liable on his contracts.

The

legal term "necessaries" is a relative term, not strictly limfor support

ited to such things as are absolutely requisite

and subsistence, but to be construed liberally and varying
with the

degree and

estate,

the rank,

and age of the

fortune,

infant.
Rainsford v Fernvick, Carter R. 215.
His real and not his ostensible fortune and circumstances, however, constitute the test and criterion as to
whether the articles are necessaries or not.

Story v Perry,

4 Carr. Ic P. 526.
Another rule laid down in the

case of Peters v

Fleming, 6 1ees. & Wels. 42, is as followvs:
saries

"The term neces-

includes such things as are useful and suitable to

I0
the state and condition in life of the party, and not merely
such as are required for bare

subsistence.

It is a question

for the jatry whether the articles are such as a reasonable
of ti:e infant would require for

person of the age and station
real use."

Food, lodging, clothes, medicine, and education, to
use concise words, constitute the five leading elements in t.u
doctrine of the

infant's

necessaries.

tical test we must construe these
al sense,

But to apply a prac-

five wor'cis in a very liber-

and somewhat according to

tune, prospects, age, circdmnstances,

the social position, forand general

situation of

the infant himself.
Schouler 622.
Articles

of mere ornament

are not necessaries.

The

true rule to be taken is that all such articles as are purely
ornamental are not necessary and are to be rejected, because
they cannot be required for any one; and for such matters,
therefore, an infant cannot be made responsible.
were not of this

description,

then the

But if they

question arises whether

they w re bought for the necessary use of the party, in order
to support himself properly in the delree, state, and station
of life

in

which he moves.

If

they were

for such articles

the infant may be made responsible.
Porters v Fleming, 6 1-1., W. 42.

An infant's board bill w,hile attending school is
included among necessaries for which he may be compelled to
pay.
Kil;ore v Rich, 83 Me. 305.
In fact anything which is needful to the infant's
wants comes Linder the head of necessaries.
No express promise is necessary in order to

render

an ihfant liable for necessaries.
Gray v Ballou, 4 Wend. 403.
And though an infant is liable on Kis implied contract for necessaries, yet

it seems well settled that he is

not bound by his contract to pay a sum certain therefor as an
account stated, but only for what they are reasonably worth.
Beeler v Young, 1 Bibb.
Oliver v Woodroffe,

519.

4 M. & W. 670.

As a general rule it is the tradesman's duty to acquaint himself
as well as

with the infant's

circumstances and necessities,
he

to take notice of supplies by other tradesmen;

credits him at his peril.
Davis v Caldwell, 12 Cush. 513.
Kline v L' Armoureux, 2 Paige Ch. 419.
But under

certain circumstances

inquiry as to

the-

ther the articles are necessaries may be dispensed witn by
the party firnishing the infant.

Thus in the case of Dalton

12
v Gib, 7 Scott 117, wvlere an infant, living in a style of som
pretension, purchased of a tradesman in the course of fbur
months silks to the amount of thirty-five pounds, some of whicL
were delivered in the presence of her mother, it was held that
this presence of the mother when the da~ighter purchased the
articles, and her omission to reject those which were delivered to the daughter rendered inquiry unnecessary.
wants of the infant be supplied by his parent

But

if the

or guardian, or

b" any other person, he cannot tender himself lihble for articles which would otherwise be necessaries.
Angell v Mc Clellan, 16 Mass.

31.

Waiting v Toll, 9 Johns. 141.
Among those articles not adjudges necessaries in
ordinary cases are articles of mere luxury for the infant
himself, or

for the entertainment of his friends, horses and

grain or harness for them, unless necessary in carrying on
his business, loans of money, liquor, etc.
Brooks v Scott,

11 MI.

WIharton v Mc Kenzie,

-:

W. 67.

5 Q. B. 606.

Merriam v Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40.
I think the correct rule

is laid down in Peters v

Fleming, before cited, and the one generally followed by the
courts, viz.,
as

"that the term necessaries includes such things

are useful and suitable to the estate

and condition in

life of the party, and not nerely such as are required for
bare subsistence;

and it

is a question for tue jury whether

the articles are such as a reasohable person of the age and
require for real use."

station of the infant would

V.
RATIFICATION AND CONFIPATION OF INFANTS' CONTRACTS.
It is a universal rule

that an infant cannot in any

way affirm his avoidable acts or contracts during his minority.
Reeves on Domestic Relations 349.
Corey v Burton, 32 Mich. 30.
Dunton v Brown, 31 Mich. 182.
But after an infant has arrived at full age '-e mr
if he chooses ratify any such acts or contracts.

The mode in

which they ma> be ratified is sometimes prescribed by statute,
but

in the absence of any statutory provision the court in

Kline v Beebe, 6 Conn. 4S4, layd down the folloiing rules,
and claims either will be sufficient:
ification.

(2)

By the performance

(1) BY an express rat-

of acts

from w.,hich an af-

firmance may reasonably be implied.

(3) By the omission to

disaffirm .ithin a reasonable time.

In England the question

of ratification is settled by statute providing that the ratification to be binding must be in writing signed by t.ie party.
Stat.

9 Geo.

IV,

c.

14.

In this country some of the states have similar
provisions.
Thurlow v Gilmore, 40 Me. 37b.
The authorities seem to be considerably at variance
in

states

where

we have no statute,

which is

generally the

case, as to what will constitute an affirnance.

One line of

authorities holds that a direct promise after majority is
necessary to establish a direct contract made during minority,
and that a mere acknowledgement
Brocton v Sears,

will not have that

effect.

4 Allen 95.

But this doctrine is repudiated in Henry v Root,
33 N. Y. 545.

Judge Davies, in his opinion in this case,

a large number

of cases,

length,

and holds

es the existence
of it.

As in

and discoukses

point at

great

that any act or declaration which recognizof the promise as binding is

the case of agency,

as binding an act done by
acted as agent,

this

cites

is

a ratification

anytiing which recognizes

an agent,

an adoption of it."

or by a party who has
But

at the best what

amounts to a ratification is a very close question.

A direct

promise to pay would seem to be a complete ratification, but
then again the question arises as to what is a direct promise.
I
v Root,

think the rule laid ,1own by Judge Davies in Henry

supra,

correctly

states

the doctrine

"That a new promise, positive and certain,

in

New York:

equivalent

to a ner

contract, is not essential; but a ratification or confirmation

of what was

-lone

,luring minority

is

suL'ficient to make the

contv'act obli!atory."
Practically the same
Dutch,

14 Mass.

457,

where the

view is held in Whitney v
court

ratification need not be such as to
to pay.

says:

"The terms

of the

import a direct promise

All that is necessary is that the infant after attainl-

ing majority should expressly agree to ratify his contracts
by words, oral or in

writing,

or by acts

which import

a rec-

ognition and a confirmation of the promise."
Then there is no express promise the general rule
is that acts which show otmership and enjoyment of the property with knoviedge of all the circumstances, or recognition
of the validity of the contract, without any act or declaration of disaffirmance, are sufficient; as retaining possession, using, selling, mortgaging, or converting the property
to the

infant's om use.
Chapin v Shafer, 409 N. Y. 407.
Also part payment.

Henry v Root, 33 N. Y. 526.
A ratification of the contract has often been inferred from the silence of the infant after his arrival at full

age, coupled with his retaining possession of the consideration,
or availing h~mself in

any manner

his reception of rent under a

of his conveyance;

voidable lease.

such as

Morgan v Morgan,

1 Atk.

4 k.

The omission to disaffirm a contract within a rasonable time has been held sufficient ratification.
2 Kent's Com.
Dallas, J.,
35, said:
firmance

295.

in the case of Holmes v Blogg, 8 Taunt.

"The infant is bound to give notice
of a voidable contract

Lf

the disaf-

within a reasonable

time."

In this case the court held that he ought to give notice within four months.

But this point has been discussed in several

cases in different states, and they hold what will be a reasonable time will be governed by the circumstances in each
case.
Jenkins v Jenkins, 12 Ia. l95.
Stout v Merrill, 35 Ia. 56.
Wallace's Lessee v Lewis, 4 Harr.

(Del.) 80.

State v Plaisted, 43 N. H. 414.
VI.
AVOIDANCE OF INFANTS' CONTRACTS.
A large majority

of an infant's

disaffirmed by him at his election.
ed that right he cannot retract.

contracts may be

But having once exercis-

Thus it was held in the case

of Edgerton v Wolf, 6 Gray 458, that if he surrenders property
received under a contract of purchase, evidently intending
thereby to give up all his interest in it, he cannot afterwards
recall

such surrender

and

retake the property.

As for the

time of the exercise of this right,

contracts respecting

personal property may be disaffirmed during the infancy of tL
maker,

or within a reasonable

time

after

he attains

nis maj-

ority.
Chapin v Shafer, 49
Stucke

I.

Y.

407.

v Yorder, 33 Ia. 173.

But the rule is otherwise in regard to real estate.
In the case of Zouch v Parsons, 3 Burr.,
whether

the conveyance

the question arose

could be avoided by him during

and it was held that it could not.

infancy

This case has been deemed

conclusive authority on this point, and has been generally
followed since.
Emmons v Murray, 16 N. H. 386.
Bool v Mix, 17 Wend. 119.
The modes of disaffirmance are various according to
the nature of the act or contract to be disaffirmed, and the
circumstances of the particular case.

The general rule is

that there must be some positive and decided act of dissent
adverse to the original act.
Jackson v Carpenter,
Th s a

11 Johns.

539.

contract of service may

be disaffirmed by

simpl-y leaving tne employer and engaging in the service of
another,

or by an action for tne value of the labor performed.
Thitmarsh v Hall, 3

Denio 375.

A conveyance of the same land after majority by
a deed inconsistant with the first has been held sufficient.
Irvine v Irvine, 9 Wall. 617.
But

it is held in New York before suit can be brought

by an individual to recover the possession of lands conveyed
during infancy,

he must make an

entry upon the lands

and exe-

cute a record deed to a third person, or do some other act of
equal notoriety in disaffirmance of the first deed, such as
demanding possession or giving notice of an intention not to
be bouni by the first
Voohries
Illinois,

deed.
v Voohries,
however,

24 Barb.

150.

and dome other states

by statute

make conveyances of minors binding unless disaffirmed within
three years after ',is majority; if not within that time they
;vill be upheld.
Blaukenship v Stout, 25 Ill. 132.
It seems to me that this is the reasonable rule,
and one which ought to be adopted in all the states.

Three

years is a reasonable time, and it seems to me would do away
with a great deal of litigation to adopt such a rule generally.
VII.
MUST THE INFANT RESTORE THE CONSIDERATION UPON RESCINDING?
The next point to be considered is xhether or aot
the infant must return the consideration upon repudiating the

19
contract, and this is a mooted question at this time with the
courts.

In the

case of Bartholemew v Finnemore, 17 Barb.

428, where an infant purchased a horse of the defendant and
paid for him in property which he delivered to the defendant,
and after he had kept the horse about two months, during
which time by misuse the horse was greatly lessened in value,
and then tendered him back and demanded a return of the property, it was held that he could not recover the property
without returning the consideration received by him.
Hand in discussing this point said:

Justice

"After the infant has en-

joyed the benefit of the property in whole or in part, there
is no equity in his avoiding his contract and reclaiming the
property he delivered in exchange, without

restoring the con-

sideration, or at least an equivalent."
This same view is held in the following
Holmes v Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508.

cases:

Taft v Pike, 14 Vt. 415.

Kitchen v Lise, 11 Paige 107.
But in the case of Carpenter v Carpenter, 45 Ind.
142, Judge Worden reviewed a large number of cases, and holds
that the consideration need not be returned.
he says:

In his opinion

"The contracts df infants except those

ries are void or voidable;

for necessa-

and those in relation to personal

property may be rescinded during infancy.
tations made by the plaintiff

The false represen-

(the infant), as alleged, that

20
he was of full

age,

valid,

does not make the contract

and does

not estop him from setting up his infancy in avoidance of tne

him for tort.

before he

of the

.

.

Upon icoking into the case the

Upon the avoidance

could maintain the action.
the case

contract by the plaintiff,

had been made,
at once

..

furnish ground of an action against

was not bound to make any tender of the property at

plaintiff
all

may

although it

contract,

stood as if

none

claim to his horse became

and the plaintiff's

complete."
But it

is held in the case of Green v Green, 69 N.Y.

553, if the infant has consumed, or wasted, or disposed of the
that

consideration received, he can still disaffirm, ani
without

restoring the consideration, and the other party has

no remedy.
Stout v Merrill, 35 Ia. 47,

is

the different authorities as holding tliat
rescind without restoring the

frequently cited by
the infant

consideration;

but a

cannot

careful

reading of the case will show that it holds precisely with
the

case of Green v Green, 69 N. Y.

, supra, that if he has

the consideration he must return it; but if he has wasted it
during minority, he can recover back his property without returning the consideration.

The ju- e in that

case

cites Sec.

2540 of the Statutes of Iowa which reads as follows:
is

bound not only for contracts

for necessaries,

"A minor

but also his

21
other contracts, unless he disaffirms them within a reasonable
time after he attains his majority, and restores to the other
party all money or other property received by him by virtue
of the contract, and remaining within his control at any time
after his attaining his majority."
ute liberally it

So construing this stat-

would seem to imply tflat if

wasted the consideration before majority,
without restoring the consideration.

the infant had

he could Liisaffinr

I think that the weight

of authority will uphold the following rule:

If

the infant

has or has had the consideration since attaining his majority
he must in order to affirm return the consideration; but if he
has wasted the consideration before reaching majority, then
he can disaffirm the contract and recover back his property
without returning the consideration.
Green v Green, 69 N. Y. 553.
Stout v Merrill, 35 Ia. 47.
Chandler v Simmons, 97 Aiass.

506.

One principle seems to be firmly established by the
courts:

That the infant cannot on attaining his majority hold

to an exchange or purchase made by him during infancy and its
advantages, and thus affirm that while pleading his infancy to
avoid the payment of the purchase money.
Kitchen v Lee, 11 Paige 107.
Kerr v Bell, 44 Mo. 120.

Klein v Bell, 6 Conn. 494.
repudiate his pur-

Thus an infant mortgagor cannot

chase money mort~fage and still keep t'Ie property.
Curtis v Yc

Otter man v Moak,
hite
The
is

26 0.

St.

66.

3 Sandf.

Ch.

431.

Dougal,

v Brouch,

51 Int.

210.

effect of the disaffirmance of a

wholly executory

is

infant, and place them

to

release t ].eaaiuit

both in statu quo.

only on the part of the a~ult,
whatever he has advanced,
by him under it,

contract which

as well
If it

as trhe

is executory

the infant may recover back

or the value of services rendered

unless he has received benefit from it before

disaffirmance, in which case he cannot recover.
Millard v Howlett, 19 Wend. 301.
The aim of the courts on this point seems to be to
do

justice

it

is

as nearly as possible between

the parties,

and if

possible without taking away too many of the righ'1ts of

the infant, to place them in the position in which they were
at the beginning of the traRmaction.
VII.
LIABILITY OF

TIFARCT FOR TORTS AND FRAUDS.

Infants are generally :;eld responsible t,;e sace as
afIults for torts
at all

committed by tf.em,

and when they are liable

the remedies and rules of evidence

are the

same a6ainst

them as against

adults.

Haile v Lillie, 3 Hill 149.
Hartfield v Roper, 21 Wend. 615.
Bullock V Babcock, 3 Vend.
So

391.

some authorities hold titat an infant who hires

a horse to go to a place agreed on, but goes to some ot.er
place in a differeit direction, he is liable in trover or conversion for an unlawful conversion of the horse.
Homer v Thyng, 3 Pick. 392.
Morton, J.,
said:
too,

"The defense

who delivered the opinion in this case,

in this

case is infancy.

It is contended,

that this action is founded in contract, and tiat t-e

defendants cannot be ousted of this

defence by changing trie

form of the action from contract to

tort.

Infants are liable

in actions arising ex delicto, but not those arising ex contractu.

The defendant, however, contends t -at there is a

qualification of this rule, and thiat infants are liable for
positive

wTrongs only, and not for constructive tort.

know of no such distinction. . . . .

.

But we

. It is true an infant

cannot become a trespasser by any prior or subsequent consent,
but he may be guilty of tort as well by omission of duty as
by the commission of positive wrongs.
frauds as well as

He is also liable

fo-

torts, and his liability is to be determined

by the real nature of the transaction, and not by the form of
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the action.
vel- for

Although an infant

shall not be charged in

tro-

,oods sold to him with a knowledge of his infancy,

and althougn an action will not lie against an infant for affirming himself to be of full age in

the execution of a con-

yet detinue will lie against an infant for joods deliv-

tract,

ered upon a special contract for a specific purpose after the
contract is avoided, and assumpsit will lie against an infant
for money embezzled,

for the court will look through the form

of the action into the tortious nature of tfe transaction."
But Pemrose v Curren, 3 Rowle (Penn.) squarely denies tie
proposition, and holds in a similar case that an infant may
plead his infancy in

bar of an action for dama~es,

and the

reasoning of Judge Rogers in this case seems to me to be
sound.

He says:

"This is a transaction in which parents and

guardians have a deep interest, and particularly those who
educate their children from under their own eye, at a distance
in our seminaries of learning.

It

ar-o ints to tuis:

If a

keeper of a livery stable, or am innkeeper, whose business
is

it

to let out horses and carriages to hire, chooses to en-

trust tuem to minors contrary to the assent and wishes of
their parents, and an injury is done by the young man in the
folly and heedlessness of youth, going to a -iffereit place
or farthIer

than was intended,

the fatuer must eith-er pay the

damages or suffer his child to be disgraced by imprisonment.
.

.

.

If the plaintiff should succeed, tf-ere would be

.....

no want of pretences upon which infants mij-t be charged, and
there would be an end to the protection
ly affords them. .

.

."

,hich the law so wise-

Judge Rogers also in his opinon

severely criticizes Homer v Thyng, and says that the fundamental error in that case consisted in considering the conduct
of the infant as a violation of a contract, whereas tiiere was
no contract which could be enforced.

While the Pennsylvania

rule seems to me to be the better one of the two,

yet I think

the weight of authority is in favor of the Massachusetts rule.
New York follows the Massachusetts rule, but limits
it somewhat.

In the case of Moore v Eastman, 1 Hun 578, Judge

Gilbert laid down the following rule:
liablejwho has hired a horse,

"To render an infant

in an action for trespass, he

must do some willful and positive act which amounts to an
election on his part to disaffirm the contract; a bare neglect
to protect the animal from injury, and to return it at the
time agreed upon is not sufficient.

If

ie willfully and in-

tentionally injure the animal, an action of trespass will lie
against him for the tort;

but not

if the injury complained of

occurred in the act of driving the animal through his unskilfullness and want of knowledge, discretion, and j-ad6ment..
I think there is no doubt but tat the proposition
laid &odn in Homer v Thyng, tiiat an action -,ill not lie against
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an infant
of full

'rho obtains property by representing

age,

has been overthrown by the

vcignt

himself to be
of authority.

Badger v Phinney, 13 Mass. 343.
Wallace v Morse,

5 Hill 3S1.

Xilgore v Jordan, 17 Tex. 349.
Hemphill, C. J.,

in his opinion in the Texas case,

above cited, gives an exhaustive review of the law upon this
point,

going back

to t: e Roman Law and following

date, and he declares that the authorities are

it

up to

sufficient to

show that the fraudulent acts and concealments or representations of infants

.'rlen made with a view to deceive

and defraud

others will be as binding upon them as upon adults, and their
contracts

will be enforced against

them.

From this brief review of the contracts of infants
I think the following propositions, with slight exceptions,
are substantially correst, and can be maintained in New York:
(1)
saries,

The

contracts of infants,

except for neces-

.'fhich are binding, are not void but voidable.
(2)

That the infant cannot affirm his voidable

contracts until he arrives at majority.
(3)

That he can disaffinn his contracts .,iith re-

gard to personalty at any time,

but contracts in relation to

real property cannot be disaffirmed until he reaches majority.
(4)

That the affirmance of his

contracts may be
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express

or implied,

and what will be

an implied ratification

depends upon the circumstances in each case.
(5)

That if

the infant has the property

in

his

possession at the time of disaffirming, or has had it since
he attained

his majority,

he must

return tne consideration

upon disaffirming.
(6)
an'

That the

infant is liable for his willful torts

false representations

the same

as adults.

